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Abstract 
 
Since the Al-Qaeda terrorist group struck in the United States 
in September 2011, the upsurge of terrorism has become more 
frequent and deadly globally. Using sociology of education, 
with emphasis on indoctrination, the article explored Al-
Shabaab as an emerging terrorist group in Somalia. The study 
found that Al-Shabaab emerged from some Islamic movement 
with the goal of establishing an Islamic state in Somalia. The 
group has established networks in some foreign countries and 
has also created several avenues to raise funds for its 
operations. The terrorist group has carried out several attacks, 
killing and wounding several thousands of people. Although 
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efforts have been made to curb the gruesome activities of the 
group, the end of the group seems not to be in sight going by 
its spread. It is therefore recommended among others, the 
need for counter-media-war especially through the social 
media platform to dissuade young people from joining the 
group. 
 
Keywords: Al-Shabaab, Terrorism, Somalia, Islamic 
Movement 
 
Introduction 
 
There seems to be a revival in terrorist activities globally since 
Al-Qaeda struck in the United States in September 2011. 
Suffice to say till that incident; terrorism had not been a great 
deal of subject of study, comment, debate and controversy 
(Laqueur, 2004). Moreover, its frequency and devastating 
calamities was not as it is today. The way in which terrorism is 
spreading in contemporary times is worrisome. Howard and 
Sawyer (2004) categorised terrorist organizations into three: 
ideological (left and right wing), ethno-nationalist (irredentist, 
separatist, autonomy), and politico-religious groups. Lately, 
terrorism linked to Islamic religion seems to be on the 
increase. Africa is not left out in the surge of terrorist 
activities. 
According to Whittaker (2002), Libya and Algeria are 
places in Africa associated with terrorist activities on a ground 
scale; the first as exporter of terrorists and the second as an 
arena for pitiless fratricide. Recently, Nigeria and Somalia have 
joined the list. Terrorist groups in the two countries appear to 
have a link with Islamic religion. While Boko Haram is 
tormenting the Nigerian populace and is fast spreading to 
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Cameroon, Al-Shabaab is on the offensive against Somalia and 
is also spreading to neighbouring countries like Kenya.Indeed, 
Somalia appears quite different from other sub-Saharan 
African countries; given its proximity with the Middle East 
and its people’s dedication to Islam. Its affinity with Arabs is 
far stronger than its African neighbours. 
It is therefore not a surprise that many Somalis trace their 
origin to the prophet Mohammed companions-or to itinerant 
Sheiks or saints who travelled to Somalia and married local 
women (JSOU Report, 2014). This study focuses on Al-
Shabaab a terrorist group in Somalia, its origin, activities, 
funding, growth, efforts at curbing its gruesome activities and 
recommendations to curtail activities of the group or possibly 
eradicate it.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
The essence of a theory is to shed light on how and why a 
particular phenomenon occurs the way it does. It provides 
insight into existing knowledge which can be tested against 
empirical evidence. This study is anchored on the theory of 
sociology of education. Dukheim (1961) argued that education 
in traditional societies encouraged mechanical solidarity as it 
killed individual consciousness. Dukheim went further to state 
that humans have two consciousnesses. While one of such 
consciousnesses is from a group or an entire society, the other 
is from an individual person. Personality has to do with 
distinctiveness of an individual from all others. When 
mechanical solidarity is at its strongest, collective 
consciousness swallows individual consciousness which blurs 
distinction between individuals.  
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Mechanical solidarity in a modern sense according to 
Karlpatrick (1972) is called indoctrination. In reality, 
indoctrination simply denotes inculcating attitudes and beliefs 
into people’s minds by passing their free and critical 
deliberations. The author added that this type of education 
was rather a norm than an exception in a traditional society. 
Indoctrination is to make people think, speak, act, believe, etc, 
alike, and fear the same thing. Al-Shabaab uses propaganda 
and indoctrination to get attention of the youths to fight the 
cause of Islam. Young Muslims that fled to America because 
of civil wars that have ravaged Somalia were made to feel 
guilty for living comfortably in America while their homeland 
is in turmoil. They were told that Al-Shabaab is promoting 
global jihad using Somalia as its enclave and that if youths 
participate in jihad, they will become heroes. Al-Shabaab also 
established networks in the West that target young people at 
mosques with a view to indoctrinating them, telling them it 
was necessary for them to fight the enemies of Islam. Youths 
were invited to Cafes and restaurants where they were 
indoctrinated and latter invited to join jihad in Somalia (Baehr, 
2011). Little wonder that Juergensmeyer (2004) contends that 
religion does not only facilitate terrorists’ goals by providing 
moral legitimacy to their cause, it also defines the rewards that 
combatants can attain. Suffice to say that it is the so called 
promised rewards for fighting the cause of Islam (through 
indoctrination) that make people to engage in killing others 
especially people of opposite religion with astonishing 
brutality, getting involved in suicide bombings among others. 
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Origin of Al-Shaabab 
 
The exact circumstances of Al-Shabaab’s origins are still being 
debated; however, previous Islamist movements are believed 
to have contributed to its formation (ICG, 2014).The Joint 
Special Operations University, (JSOU) Report (2014) traced 
the formation of Al-Shabaab to some members of Al Ittihad 
Al Islamiya (AIAI) formed in 1984. Al Ittihad Al Islamiya 
(AIAI) was a nationalist organization formed with the aim of 
overthrowing the Barre regime but changed direction by 
arrogating to itself the responsibility of liberating the Ogaden 
region from Ethiopia. When Ethiopia retaliated to AIAI attack 
on Ogaden, the group lost its vigour and its strength was 
further drained by internal squabbles. For instance, several of 
its jihadists like Sheik Hassan DahirAweys later became a 
leader of Hizbul Islam, Aden Hashi Farah Ayro became one of 
the founders of Al-Shabaab and Hassan al-Turaki later led a 
faction of the RasKamboniBrigde that allied with Al-Shabaab 
in 2009. In the same vein, Agbiboa (2014) equally traced the 
origin of A-Shabaabto Al Itihaad Al Islamiya (AIAI)- a 
Wahhabi Islamist terrorist organization that emerged in 
Somalia in the 1980s with the aim of replacing Mohammed 
Said Barre’s regime with an Islamic state.  
Thus, in 2000, the remnant of AlAI reformed into Al-
Shabaab and was subsequently incorporated into the Islamic 
Courts Union (ICU) as its radical youth militia. The author 
added that Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in December 2006 
gave impetus to the development and radicalization of Al-
Shabaab as it created deep-seated animosity between Somalia 
and Ethiopia with the opportunity to recruit several thousands 
of nationals in Somalia as volunteer fighters and also forced 
the group to adopt an effective Guerrilla-style operational 
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strategy in its bid to resist Ethiopian advance into the South. 
Vilkko (2011) sees Al-Shabaab as an off-shoot of the ICU. 
Factionalization within ICU led to the disintegration of the 
group, and hence, the emergence of Al-Shabaab which came 
to inherit the roles of ICU by mounting resistance against 
foreign influences. To Harnisch (2010), Al-Shabaab simply 
mean “the youth” became an independent entity in 2007. 
Before then it was the military wing of the ICU. In 2006, 
Ethiopian troops entered Somalia to establish the authority of 
the United Nations mandated Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) and also to destroy a coalition of Sharia 
Courts called ICU that controlled much of the country then. 
Upon Ethiopian invasion (which was an anti- terror alliance 
formed by the US but led by Ethiopian troops), the ICU fled, 
but Al-Shabaab- its military wing - stayed to fight the invading 
forces.  
Al-Shabaab’s primary objectives in the beginning were: to 
drive Ethiopian troops out of Somalia; and to establish an 
Islamic State in Somalia. But now the group appears to be 
spreading its tentacles internationally. In addition to the fact 
mentioned above as being responsible for the formation of Al-
Shabaab, Baehr (2011) alleged that another reason attributed 
to the formation of Al-Shabaab aside from the above was the 
2004 United States (US) bombing of a Union of Islamic 
Courts safe house. The USA suspected that three of the 
terrorists responsible for the bombings at the US embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 were in the safe house. As a 
result of the US attack, ICU decided to establish a military arm 
in order to safeguard Islam. It is important to state that, while 
the ICU held sway, it was able to bring order and security and 
when Al-Shabaab came to the scene after the disintegration of 
ICU, many people hoped that, regardless of means and 
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ideology, Al-Shabaab could do the same. In terms of doctrine, 
Back (2013) contends that Al-Shabaabideology and doctrine is 
very much in line with that of Takfir. This movement called 
Takfir allows its members to declare other Muslims 
unbelievers (kafirs), reject and resistforeigners from coming to 
their country, and even engage in suicide mission in order to 
kill their enemies.  
Be it as it may, it can be gleaned from the above that Al-
Shabaab emanated from previous Islamic movements with the 
aim of warding off Ethiopian invading forces and also to turn 
Somalia into an Islamic State. After splitting from ICU, Al-
Shabaab has carried out various attacks against its perceived 
enemies. For instance, National Consortium for the Study of 
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (CNCSTR) (2013) 
argued that since its formation in 2007, Al-Shabaab has carried 
out about 550 attacks, killing more than 1, 600 and wounding 
more than 2,100. The table below shows some of the attacks 
perpetrated by Al-Shabaab from 2008- January, 2015. 
 
Table 1: Selected Incidents of Al-Shabaab Attacks 2008- 
January 2015 
S/N Dates Location Nature of 
Attack 
Estimated 
Casualties  
1. January 24, 
2008 
Near African 
Union Base in 
Mogadishu 
Suicide car 
bombing 
13 people killed 
2. February 5, 
2008 
Port city of Bossaso Twin bombings 25 people killed, 
at least 70injured 
3. September 3, 
2008 
Attack on the 
Somalia Presidential 
compound. 
15 killed people , 
and 25 injured 
4. October 6, 
2008 
Mogadishu Mortar aimed at 
Presidential 
palace struck a 
market place 
17 people killed 
5. October 29, United Nations Coordinated 24 people killed 
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2008 compound, the 
Ethiopian consulate 
and the presidential 
palace in Hagesis. 
suicide bombing
6. February 22, 
2009 
African Union 
Military base in 
Mogadishu 
Bombing 
against African 
Union base in 
Mogadishu. 
11 people killed. 
7. December 3, 
2009 
Mogadishu 
University 
Suicide 
bombing during 
a graduation 
ceremony at the 
Mogadishu 
University. 
At least 23 
people killed 
8. July 11, 2010 Kampala, Uganda Al-Shabaab 
claimed 
responsibility 
for twin suicide 
bombing in 
Kampala, 
Uganda. 
More than 70 
people were 
killed. 
9. 2011 Somalia It was allege 
that Al-Shabaab 
blocked the 
delivery of aid 
from some 
Western relief 
agencies during 
the 2011 
famine.  
The blockage of 
relief materials in 
the midst of 
famine killed 
tens of 
thousands of 
Somalis. 
10. March 3, 2012 Puntland region in 
Somalia 
Al-Shabaab 
attacked soldier 
from Somalia’s 
semi-
autonomous 
Puntland region 
At least 9 people 
were killed  
11 March 15, 
2012 
Mogadishu Suicide 
bombing  
At least 5 people 
were killed 
12. March 19, 
2012 
Refugee camp near 
presidential palace 
in Mogadishu 
Firing of 
mortars on the 
refugee camp by 
suspected 
members of Al-
Shabaab 
About six people 
died in the attack 
13. March 21, Mogadishu A car bomb 2 people 
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2012 suspected to be 
the handiwork 
of Al-Shabaab 
werewounded. 
14. April 4, 2012 National Theatre in 
Mogadishu  
Suicide bomb 
attack by Al-
Shabaab 
At least 6 people 
were killed. 
15 September 20, 
2012 
Mogadishu Double suicide 
attack by 
suspected 
members of Al-
Shababaab 
14 people were 
killed. 
16. January 17, 
2013 
Al-Shabaab 
claimed it killed 
French 
intelligence 
agent Denis 
Alex when 
French 
operation made 
a failed attempt 
to free him. 
1 person killed 
17 March 18, 
2013 
Mogadishu Suicide car 
bomb alleged to 
be carried out 
by Al-Shabaab 
At least 10 
people were 
killed. 
18 April 15, 2013 Mogadishu A nine-man 
suicide 
commando 
blast its way 
into Mogadishu 
main court 
complex, some 
blowing up their 
explosive vests, 
while others 
sprayed bullets 
in a rampage. 
At least 29 
people were 
killed. 
19 May 3, 2014 Mogadishu Bomb explosion 
credited to Al-
Shabaab 
At least 6 people 
were killed. 
20 May 24, 2014 Mogadishu Attack by Al-
Shabaab on 
Somalia’s 
Parliament. 
At least 10 
people were 
killed 
21 December 25, AMISOM 3 African Union 
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2014 headquarters 
(African Union 
Force) in Somalia. 
Soldiers and a 
civilian were 
killed 
22 January 4, 
2015 
Mogadishu 
International Air 
Port 
An explosive –
laden vehicle 
rammed 
another vehicle 
setting a huge 
blast 
4 people were 
killed. 
23 January 2015 Mogadishu Car bombing 
outside the gate 
of a hotel were 
Turkish 
delegates were 
preparing to 
receive their 
President. 
3 people were 
killed in the 
attack. 
24 January  2015 Al- Shabaab 
killed by firing 
squad four men 
accused of 
spying for the 
CIA and other 
intelligence 
agencies.  
4 men were 
killed. 
Compiled by the authors from different sources 
 
The cases listed above are an eloquent testimony to the fact 
that Al-Shabaab is a deadly terrorist group. Having examined 
some of the attacks perpetrated by Al-Shabaab, it is pertinent 
to equally probe into its sources of financing. 
 
Funding of Al-Shabab 
 
The political economy of civil wars has been a hot topic in 
academic research for the last ten to fifteen years. In particular, 
the focus on “self-financing” of insurgencies has gained 
attention and a lot of effort has been put into understanding 
the often quite complex and sophisticated ways armed 
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opposition groups gather funds for their struggle. The funding 
of armed opposition movements has changed substantially in 
the last two decades. During the Cold War state support or 
sponsorship of armed insurgencies was common. The 
superpowers as well as regional powers often backed proxy-
forces in foreign countries to promote their geopolitical 
interests (Vilkko, 2011). 
Today, however, the climate is tougher for an aspiring rebel 
group. States are neither the only nor necessarily the most 
prominent sponsors of armed insurgencies. Although the state 
sponsors are not fully gone, hundreds of millions no longer 
flow out of Washington’s and Moscow’s coffers and virtues 
like respecting human rights and promoting a democratic 
society play an actual role when a rebel group is looking for 
support beyond the borders of its homeland (Vilkko, 2011). 
Thus, like any significant terrorist or insurgent group, Al-
Shabaab must spend a greatdeal of time and energy raising 
money, both through licit and illicit channels. Assessing Al-
Shabaab’s linkages with revenue-producing organized crime 
pose some familiar difficulties and ambiguities. Many, and 
probably most, insurgencies and other armed opposition 
groups around the world have become involved in criminal 
activities of various types and degrees. This is especially the 
case if the group’s existence is a prolonged one like Al-
Shabaab(JSOU Report, 2014). 
Al-Shabaab has given the impression of being financially 
competent and less corrupt than the central and local 
authorities it opposes. But above all, and unlike its armed 
Somali adversaries, it pays its soldiers and operatives well and 
regularly and provides for its veterans and the families of its 
“martyrs”, leading many to believe that its operations resemble 
a “fiscal military state” (ICG Report, 2014:15). Behind the 
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fiscal responsibility mask lies the group’s major avenues for 
raising funds which includesextortion and the imposition of 
war taxes, leveraging substantial funds from drug trafficking, 
robbery, kidnapping, and other revenue-raising criminal 
enterprises that are typical to the group’s operations (Ikelegbe 
and Okumu, 2010:33; Oloo, 2010). 
For instance, the United Nations Monitoring Group on 
Somalia and Eritrea (UNMGSEM, cited in JSOU Report, 
2014:12) estimated that until Al-Shabaab’s withdrawal from 
Mogadishu, they extorted some $60 million a year from the 
city’s Bakara and SuuqBaad markets. The Monitoring Group 
suggested as well that Al-Shabab generated between $70 
million to $100 million per year in revenue from taxation and 
extortion in areas under its control, to include charcoal 
exporting and smuggling other contraband into Kenya – the 
Kismayo and Marka Ports were particularly lucrative for Al-
Shabaab in this respect. The Monitoring Group also reported 
that Al-Shabaab leveraged its religious credentials to raise 
money through zakat, annual donations that Muslims are 
obliged to give to fulfil their Islamic duties.  
In a more elaborate form, the sources of funding for Al-
Shabaab could be viewed from external and internal 
dimensions. According to Vilkko (2011) external sources of 
funding for the group include Diaspora Somalis (all Somalis 
with family ties to Somalia living outside Somalia, regardless of 
whether they live in the East African region or overseas); 
hawala money transfer companies (a system of money transfer 
via a network of hawala brokers, located around the world); 
cash couriers (specifically for larger transactions); Somali 
business community in Nairobi (usually big businesses of 
Somali families located in Nairobi who pay for protection out 
of fear of imminent attack from Al-Shabaab) andalleged 
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investment by Al-Shabab in the major business hub of 
Nairobi.  
Similarly, the internal sources of income include but are not 
limited to direct financial control and surveillance of cash-
flows; taxations; through import duties from the Port of 
Kismayo (a strategic port located in Somalia); protection 
money from businesses; protection fees derived from aid 
communities and industries; and through the pirate 
connections (Vilkko, 2011). In fact, the report of an interview 
conducted and released by the UN Monitoring Group on 
Somali (2010:99) graphically illustrated how piracy funded the 
terrorist activities of the Al-Shabaab group, thus: 
 
They (Al-Shabaab) get some of their money through the piracy. 
They have a cut... so when you hijack somebody, a ship, or you 
have people that you’ve hijacked, and you get paid off, they 
know. They will call you and tell you, ‘we know what has 
happened: pay up’. And you better pay up. 
  
It is instructive to add that the growth of information and 
communication technology (ICT) has aided the capacity of Al-
Shabaab to raise funds for its engagements. Agbiboa (2014:30) 
had argued that ICT had allowed Al-Shabaab to tap into 
wealthy Salafi networks keen on supporting global jihad 
campaigns. He claimed that in August 2009, Al-Shabaab 
launched an online fundraising forum that raised 40 000 USD 
from members of the Somali Diaspora for the transnational 
jihadist cause. 
It is this complex network of inter-terrorist groups, ably 
aided and abetted by ICT advancement that remains not only 
the greatest challenge to monitoring the financial transactions 
of these groups, but more fundamentally assisted their growth 
across national boundaries. Incidentally, efforts to control and 
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curb the growth and activities of the terrorist group have 
drained the energies, resources and time of the international 
community, leading Bereketeab (2013:61) to assert that “the 
Horn of Africa (HOA) comprising Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, 
Eritrea and Djibouti has been the most conflict-ridden region 
on the continent for the last 50 years”. 
 
Growth of Al-Shabaab and Efforts at Curbing its 
Activities 
 
Al-Shabaab has experienced an extraordinary rise by any 
measure. This is attributable to a number of key differences 
that the organization evinces. According to the ICG Report 
(2014), three vital differences in operations have contributed 
immensely to the sporadic growth in both number and 
activities of the Al-Shabaab group: first, its core leadership, 
vitally from a cross-section of Somali clan-based society, 
remained remarkably constant over nearly a decade, until a July 
2013 putsch claimed a few high-profile victims; second, it has 
had a reasonably consistent declared objective, referenced to 
Islamic scriptural authority; and third, in its continuing local 
presence for several years, especially in rural areas, its leaders 
have become adept at the cut and thrust of grassroots political 
governance.  
Furthermore, the ICG Report (2014) claimed that, in view 
of the above strategic advantages, the al-Shabaab group will 
continue to control both money and minds. Elaborating 
further, the report argued that the group has the advantage of 
at least three decades of Salafi-Wahhabi proselytization (daawa) 
in Somalia; social conservatism is already strongly entrenched 
– including in Somaliland and among Somali minorities in 
neighbouring states –giving it deep reservoirs of fiscal and 
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ideological support, even without the intimidation it routinely 
employs. Additionally, the ICG Report asserted that the 
group’s proven ability to adapt militarily and politically offers it 
flexibility that is assisted by its leadership’s freedom from 
direct accountability to any single constituency.  
It is important to point out that even though Al-Shabaab 
originated in 2002, it is generally agreed that the Ethiopian 
invasion of Somalia in December 2006 marked a watershed in 
the growth, development and radicalization of the group. 
According to Agbiboa, (2014:28), the Ethiopian invasion of 
Somalia in 2006 provided Al-Shabaab with three unique 
opportunities for expansion: first, was the opportunity to draw 
on deep-seated Somali hostility towards Ethiopia to recruit 
thousands of nationalist volunteers; second, was that the 
invasion forced Al-Shabaab to adopt an effective guerrilla-style 
operational strategy as a means of resisting Ethiopian advance 
into the South; and third, by forcing the Islamic Courts Union 
leaders who had exerted a level of moderating influence on Al-
Shabaab to flee Somalia, the invasion allowed the group to 
become even more radical, while at the same time severing its 
ties to other Somali organizations.  
In essence, it is safe to say thatthe Ethiopian invasion of 
Somalia was a primary factor in the ultra-radical turn of Al-
Shabaab, “transforming the group from a small, relatively 
unimportant part of a more moderate Islamic movement into 
the most powerful and radical armed faction in the country” 
(Wise, 2011:4 cited in Agbiboa, 2014:28). To be sure, it was 
during the turn of events following the invasion drama that 
Al-Shabab developed an effective recruitment strategy which 
eventually defined and expanded both its growth and scope of 
operations. 
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Thus, given the regional and international reach of the 
organization, it is unsurprising that Al-Shabaab was able to 
recruit from a wide-range of countries. The organization 
utilized extremist teachings, literature, videos, and other 
propaganda materials to spread its message and to bring 
recruits into its fold (JSOU Report, 2014; CNN Report, 2014). 
Their targets range from younger Somali population; refugees; 
internally displaced persons, especially children; unemployed; 
non-ethnic Somalis, especially of the English, Swahili and 
Arabic speaking populations; and Minority Muslim population 
in Europe and America all of whom are motivated by several 
factors but notably ideological and pragmatic calculations 
(Botha and Abdile, 2014; JSOU Report, 2014:18). However, all 
of Al-Shabaab’s recruitment efforts in the Horn of Africa have 
taken place in a context of growing conservatism among 
Muslims in the region (cited in JSOU Report, 2014). 
Interestingly, Al-Shabaab’s international recruitment efforts 
have more than any other enhanced its capacity for growth, 
and have become a source of concern in recent times (Anti-
Defamation League, ADL Report, 2013). For instance, a 2011 
Assessment Report, with contributions by a number of 
specialists having direct experience and/or deep research 
experience in Somali affairs, specifically addressed the many 
issues involving the Al-Shabaab foreign fighters, supporters, or 
leaders. The report concluded that of “the 85 member 
executive council of Al-Shabaab today, 42 are Somalis and 43 
are foreigners, where the hard liners led by the foreign jihadis 
wield enormous influence and have access to resources and 
the means to dictate their wishes to the less powerful factions” 
(cited in JSOU, Report, 2014:24).  
These foreigners are central in training new fighters and in 
the acquisition of new arms, ammunition, and other military 
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equipments. They have also been key Al-Shabab field   
commanders, transferring and applying combat and guerrilla 
tactics, techniques and procedures from firefights to 
improvised explosive device (IED) employment to 
kidnappings, assassinations and suicide bombings. As a result 
of these foreign supports, Al-Shabaab has heightened its 
operational capacity in several targeted regions, causing 
unprecedented damages. 
According to Agbiboa (2014), since 2008, Al-Shabaab has 
demonstrated that it has the operational capability to launch 
deadly attacks against outposts of the West and perceived 
enemies outside Somalia. He claimed that in October 2008, 
Al-Shabaab coordinated five suicide bomb attacks that hit the 
UN Development Programme compound, the Ethiopian 
Consulate and various government offices, killing several 
dozen. Again, in September 2009, the group bombed the 
African Union Peace Keeping Mission in Mogadishu, killing 
more than 20 people and damaging the offices of a U.S. firm 
that was purportedly providing support to peacekeepers. 
Similarly, in July 11, 2010, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility 
for suicide bombing of two groups of fans watching the World 
Cup in the Ugandan capital, Kampala, which killed more than 
70 people, including one American citizen (Agbiboa, 
2014:28).Furthermore, in 2013, Al-Shabaab claimed 
responsibility for the terrorist attack at Westgate Mall in 
Nairobi, Kenya, which killed 72 persons and injured over 200 
people (Back, 2013). Details can be found in table 1 
Perhaps what many scholars and observers perceive to be 
the most important and troubling factor that has aided the 
recent growth of Al-Shabab is their deepening ties with Al-
Qaeda since 2009 (Baehr, 2011). According to Agbiboa 
(2014:29) Al-Shabaab’s deepening ties with Al-Qaeda have had 
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profound effects on its structure and operational strategy in 
two main ways: first, Al-Shabab’s affiliation with Al-Qaeda 
significantly altered the former’s leadership component – after 
the death of its leader, Aden HashiAyro, in May 2008, Al-
Shabab’s command structure welcomed a number of Al-
Qaeda core members into top leadership roles; second, until 
2008, Al-Shabaab made use of relatively conventional guerrilla 
tactics in its attacks against the invading Ethiopian forces, but 
following their growing ties with Al-Qaeda, the group has 
mastered suicide attacks as a means of achieving its ends. 
Apart from Al-Shabaab’s link with Al-Queda, Barhr (2011) 
reveals how the group is spreading to the West and other 
countries. In fact,more of young jihadist sympathisers are 
travelling to Somalia to take part in the Al-Shabaab Jihad. 
According to this author, about 2,000 jihadistscome from 
various countries like Pakistan, Afghanistan and Arabian 
countries but bulk of Al-Shabaab foreign fighters are from the 
West. The author added that American intelligence agencies 
have evidence of a growing number of young Muslims in the 
USA that are attracted by the ideology of Al-Shabaab and want 
to go to Somalia to fight alongside with them. Al-Shabaab 
targets young people at mosques to indoctrinate them that it is 
a duty to fight against the enemies of Islam. Al-Shabaab has 
been able to establish its presence in Germany as there is a 
group called German Shabaab. It is also alleged that some 
jihadists in Sweden maintain contact with Al-Shabaab in 
Somalia.It is this dangerous dimension to Al-Shabaab’s 
operational strategy that has warranted an international quest 
and subsequent coalition against the group. 
Thus, countering Al-Shabab’s deep presence in south-
central Somalia requires the kind of government – financially 
secure, with a common vision and coercive means – that is 
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unlikely to materialize in the near future. More military surges 
will do little to reduce the socio-political dysfunction that has 
allowed Al-Shabaab to thrive; in certain areas it may even serve 
to deepen its hold. This challenge is attributable to the unique 
geographical, political, cultural and historical realities of 
Somaliland which serve to narrow the coalition’s window of 
opportunity (ICG Report, 2014; JSOU Report, 2014).   
However, the greatest challenge to countering Al-Shabaab’s 
operations lie in their “broader military guerrilla tactics” which 
have been described as “a rational, well-calculated strategic 
decision” to avoid a devastating confrontation from the well-
coordinated international coalition (JSOU, 2014:31). In short, 
Robert Taber’s (2002) arresting metaphor becomes apt in 
understanding the dynamics of the guerrilla tactics employed 
by Al-Shabaab as a defensive strategy. He argued thus: 
 
The guerrilla fights the war of the flea. The flea bites, hops, and 
bites again, nimbly avoiding the foot that would crush him. He 
does not seek to kill his enemy at a blow, but to bleed him and 
feed on him, to plague and bedevil him, to keep him from resting 
and to destroy his nerve and morale (Taber, 2002:50 cited in 
JSOU, 2014:32). 
 
Despite these demoralizing tactics and challenging terrain, 
the international community, under the coalition of the Somali 
National Army (SNA), Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF), and 
the latest combined African Union (AU) Mission to Somalia 
(AMISOM) with the support of the United States, has 
recorded remarkable successes in countering Al-Shabaab’s 
offensive. The most outstanding success recorded by these 
combined forces was that they drove Al-Shabab out of at least 
ten major south-central towns – their strongest bases – in 
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twenty days leading to the group’s dramatic retreat (ICG 
Report, 2014).  
Similarly, one of the clearest manifestations of the 
coalition’s effort is the large number of defectors abandoning 
Al-Shabaab after its recent territorial losses. Added to this is 
that, the loss of Al-Shabaab’s strongholds has damaged the 
group’s income. No longer able to rely on the level of taxes 
from Kismayo’s Port or Mogadishu’s Bakara Market, it has 
had difficulty providing the same sort of financial benefits to 
its fighters that induced many of them to join in the first place, 
and this has led to further defections. Furthermore, Al-
Shababhas lost much of the infrastructure it used for 
transmitting propaganda, such as several of its radio stations, 
another happy outcome of the coalition’s offensive. Again, 
while there are no solid numbers on just how many insurgents 
have been killed in the offensive, they are likely significant 
(JSOU Report, 2014:44).  
The United States’ efforts have largely determined the 
targeted killings of high-level Al-Shabaab terrorists and their 
Al-Qaeda sponsors. While it is difficult to quantify the effects 
their deaths had on the group, it is nonetheless clear that the 
immediate effects were poor morale among the fighters and 
personal security challenges within the rank and file of the 
group. This perhaps resulted in the surrender of a highly 
sought after Al-Shabaab leader, Zakariya Ismail Ahmed Hersi 
to the Somali National Government and African Union forces 
on December 28, 2014, following a $3million bounty offered 
by the US for any information leading to his arrest 
(Aljazeera.com, 2014).  
The international community has also heavily sanctioned 
Al-Shabaab’s members, people and countries that support it, 
as well as the group as an entity. In March 2008, the US 
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officially designated Al-Shabaab a terrorist organization under 
Executive Order (EO) 13224, opening the group up to a 
variety of sanctions, and in April 2010, President Obama in 
EO 13536 again named Al-Shabaab as an entity to be 
sanctioned, and included several prominent Al-Shabaab 
leaders such as Ahmed AbdiGodane, Hassan DahirAweys, and 
Fuad Mohammed Khalaf, and anyone “engaged in acts that 
directly or indirectly threaten the peace, security, or stability of 
Somalia (JSOU Report, 2014:46).  
In the final analysis, Al-Shabaab has committed some key 
blunders on its own that have both weakened its operational 
dynamics and aided the coalition of international community 
in their offensive. These mistakes include brutality, Salafism, 
problem with foreigners and internal schisms or bickering 
(Sage, 2010). These factors have combined to puncture the 
structure and leadership of the group leading many to believe 
that Al-Shabab may not be as appealing and popular among 
the Somalis as it used to be. This calls for an alternative 
approach by the international community in crushing the 
rapidly diminishing networks of the group.  
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
The paper has strongly advanced the argument that Al-
Shabaab is an emerging terrorist group in Somalia, with far 
reaching influences across Western Europe and the United 
States. The magnitude of its operations in the Horn of Africa, 
added to the spate of its spread across the continent are issues 
of serious concern to the international community. More so, 
Al-Shabaab’s strong ideological sentiment which has aided its 
recruitment and financing continues to attract the cooperation 
of other terrorist organizations and even state actors in the 
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international system. All these supposed advantages have 
overwhelmed the efforts by the international community to 
curb the increasing activities of Al-Shabaab. 
In view of the above, the paper recommends that 
“counter- media war”, especially through the social media 
platform, to dissuade young people from joining the 
organization must be instituted on a global scale. This is 
necessitated by the fact that the most common strategy by Al-
Shabab to recruit young fighters in Europe and the US is 
through the social media which is populated by young 
adherents. Again, greater cooperation on the part of 
governments, especially through the instrumentality of 
regional organizations (African Union and European Union) 
should be given serious attention. 
Furthermore, the coalition of international community 
(SNA, KDF and AMISOM) must intensify their offensive 
against Al-Shabaab and arrest all allegations of corruption, 
factional politics, demoralization of the fighters and 
indiscipline on the part of the troops. In our view, high level 
discipline on the part of the coalition will increase their 
goodwill from other sections of the international community 
such as the US. When all these factors are put together, the 
efforts at curbing the activities of Al-Shabaab will gain 
momentum and perhaps, yield tremendous political dividends.        
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